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Abstract. We apply a computational framework for specifying and solving sequential decision problems to
study the impact of three kinds of uncertainties on optimal emission policies in a stylized sequential emission
problem. We find that uncertainties about the implementability of decisions on emission reductions (or increases)
have a greater impact on optimal policies than uncertainties about the availability of effective emission reduction
technologies and uncertainties about the implications of trespassing critical cumulated emission thresholds. The
results show that uncertainties about the implementability of decisions on emission reductions (or increases) call
for more precautionary policies. In other words, delaying emission reductions to the point in time when effective
technologies will become available is suboptimal when these uncertainties are accounted for rigorously. By
contrast, uncertainties about the implications of exceeding critical cumulated emission thresholds tend to make
early emission reductions less rewarding.
1 Introduction
1.1 About this work
In this article we apply the framework for specifying and
solving sequential decision problems (SDPs) presented in
Botta et al. (2017b) to understand the impact of uncertainty
on optimal greenhouse gas (GHG) emission policies.
Specifically, we study the impact of
1. uncertainty about the implementability of decisions on
GHG emission reductions,
2. uncertainty about the availability of efficient technolo-
gies for reducing GHG emissions and
3. uncertainty about the implications of exceeding a criti-
cal threshold of cumulated GHG emissions.
The work is also an application of the computational the-
ory of policy advice and avoidability proposed in Botta et al.
(2017a). The theory supports a seamless approach towards
accounting for different kinds of uncertainties and makes it
possible to rigorously assess the logical consequences, in-
cluding the risks, entailed by the implementation of optimal
policies. We explain what policies are and what it means for
a policy sequence to be optimal in Sect. 2.3.
1.2 Sequential decision problems and climate change
In many decision problems in the context of climate change,
decisions have to be taken sequentially: emission rights are
issued year after year, emission reduction plans and measures
are iteratively revised and updated at certain (perhaps irregu-
lar) points in time, etc.
In its Fourth Assessment Report IPCC (2007), the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) pointed out
that responding to climate change involves “an iterative risk
management process that includes both mitigation and adap-
tation, taking into account actual and avoided climate change
damages, co-benefits, sustainability, equity and attitudes to
risk.”
The paradigmatic example of iterative SDPs in the con-
text of climate change is that of controlling GHG emissions.
In GHG emission control problems, a decision maker or a
finite number of decision makers (countries) have to select
an emission level or, equivalently, a level of emission abate-
ment (reduction) with respect to some reference emissions.
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The idea is that the selected abatement level is then imple-
mented, perhaps with some deviations, over a certain period
of time. After that period another decision is taken for the
next time period.
Implementing abatements implies both costs and benefits.
These are typically affected by different kinds of uncertain-
ties but the idea is that, for a specific decision maker, a sig-
nificant part of the benefits comes from avoided damages
from climate change. Avoided damages essentially depend
on the overall abatements: higher global abatements lead to
less damages and thus higher benefits. In contrast, costs are
very much dependent on the abatement level implemented by
the specific decision maker. Here, higher emission reductions
cost more than moderate emission reductions.
It turns out that, when considering a single decision step
and for fairly general and realistic assumptions on how costs
and benefits depend on abatement levels, the highest global
benefits are obtained if all decision makers reduce emis-
sions by certain “optimal” amounts (Finus et al., 2003; Helm,
2003; Heitzig et al., 2011).
In this situation, however, many (if not all) decision mak-
ers typically face a free-ride option: they could do even better
if they themselves did not implement any emission reduction
(or, perhaps, if they would implement less reductions) but all
the others still complied with their quotas. It goes without
saying that if all players fail to comply with their optimal
emission reduction quotas, the overall outcome will be un-
satisfactory for all or most players.
This situation is often referred to as an instance of the
“Tragedy of the Commons” Hardin (1968) and has motivated
a large body of research on, among other things, coalition
formation and the design of mechanisms to deter free-riding.
These studies are naturally informed by game-theoretical ap-
proaches and focus on the nonparametric nature of decision
making. The sequentiality of the underlying decision process
and the temporal dimension of decision making are traded for
analytic tractability. For a survey, see Heitzig et al. (2011).
Another avenue of research focuses on the investigation
of optimal global emission paths or, as we shall see in Sect.
2.3, of optimal sequences of global emission policies. Here,
the core question is how uncertain future developments, typi-
cally, the introduction of new technologies or the crossing of
climate stability thresholds, shall inform current decisions.
In a nutshell, the problems here are when global emissions
should be reduced and by how much given the uncertainties
that affect both our understanding of the earth system and
the socioeconomic consequences of implementing emission
reductions.
In these kinds of studies, the presence of multiple decision
makers with possibly conflicting interests and the question
of how emission reductions can actually be implemented is
neglected. This makes it possible to apply control theoretical
approaches and to fully account for the temporal dimension
of sequential emission games. This is also the approach fol-
lowed in this work. To the best of our knowledge, no theory is
currently available for tackling the problem of computing op-
timal emission policies for individual countries as a (mixed
sequential and simultaneous) coordination game with a finite
number of decision makers, over a finite (but not necessarily
known) number of decision steps and under different sources
of uncertainty. For a survey of SDPs under uncertainty in cli-
mate change see Parson and Karwat (2011), Peterson (2006)
and references therein.
1.3 Stylized sequential emission problems
One can try to understand the impact of uncertainties on opti-
mal emission policies for a specific, real (or, more likely, re-
alistic) emission problem. This requires, among other things,
specifying an integrated climate–economy assessment model
or, as done in Webster (2008), some tabulated version of the
model underlying the problem. The approach supports draw-
ing conclusions that are specific for the problem under in-
vestigation and is what is typically done in applied policy
advice. On the other hand, studying a specific, realistic prob-
lem makes it difficult to draw general conclusions and is well
beyond the scope of this work.
An alternative approach towards understanding the im-
pacts of uncertainties on optimal policies is to study a “styl-
ized” emission problem. A stylized emission problem does
not attempt to be realistic. Instead, it tries to capture the es-
sential features of a whole class of problems and supports
general instead of specific conclusions. This is the approach
followed in this paper.
1.4 Notation
In Sect. 5 we apply the theory for specifying and solving
SDPs from Botta et al. (2017b, a) to the stylized emission
problem from Sect. 4. The theory is based on the notion of
monadic dynamical systems originally introduced in Ionescu
(2009). In this context, monads allow one to treat deter-
ministic, nondeterministic, stochastic, fuzzy, etc. uncertainty
with a seamless approach: the differences are captured by a
single problem parameter and all computations are generic
with respect to this parameter. In a nutshell, the theory is a
dependently typed formalization of dynamic programming
(Bellman, 1957). The formalization language is Idris; see
Brady (2013). For a discussion on why functional, depen-
dently typed languages are the first choice for implementing
such formalizations, see Botta et al. (2017a).
Because the theory is dependently typed, some familiarity
with a functional, dependently typed notation is mandatory
to apply it to a specific decision problem. In this paper, we
do not assume that our readership is familiar with dependent
types and functional languages. Thus, in Sects. 2 to 6 , we
have restricted the formalism to the bare minimum. A more
complete — but still simplified — summary of the Botta et al.
(2017a) theory is provided in appendix A.
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Still, a number of formulas appear in Sects. 2 to 6. In the
rest of this section we introduce the notation used in these
formulas. This is a blend of standard mathematical notation
and standard (Haskell, Idris, Agda, etc.) functional program-
ming notation.
Thus, for instance, in Sect. 2, we write Technology =
{Available,Unavailable } to posit that Technology is a set
that consists of two elements: Available and Unavailable .
This is plain set comprehension as in Bool = {False,True },
A= {7,4,2} or Even = {2 ∗n | n ∈ N}.
Further, in Sect. 2, we write State : (t : N) → Type
to posit that “State t denotes the set of states the decision
maker can observe at the t-th decision step”. This is now
standard Idris notation. Idris (and Haskell, Agda) follows the
usual meaning of parentheses in mathematics: to enclose a
sub-expression to resolve operator precedence. The special
notation f(a) for the value of a function f :A→B at a ∈A
(very often used in physics and engineering) uses parentheses
in a nonstandard way.
Another possible source of confusion is the signature
(type) of the function State . Its domain consists of values of
type N. These are natural numbers. But its co-domain con-
sists of values of type Type! Thus, a legal definition of State
could be
State t = Bool
which posits that State is the constant function that returns
the type Bool for every t . Being able to implement func-
tions that return types is a key feature of dependently typed
languages. Among other things, it allows one to encode first-
order logic propositions as types. Thus, for instance
BoundedBy : N → List N → Type
BoundedBy n ms = All (λm⇒m v n) ms
is a legal function definition, and a value of type
BoundedBy 5 xs is equivalent to a logical proof that all
elements of xs are bounded by 5. Perhaps unexpectedly,
the type of m v n on the right-hand side of the definition
of BoundedBy is Type , not Bool . This also the type of
All (λm⇒m v n)ms as can be seen from the declaration
of BoundedBy . Thus, m v n and All (λm⇒m v n)ms
encode logical propositions as types: they are propositional
types. Here, (v) and All are standard data types defined
in the Idris libraries. Being able to encode logical proposi-
tions as types is crucial for formulating program specifica-
tions, i.e., properties that a program must satisfy to be cor-
rect. Thus, for example, a program
sqrt : Double → Double
that is meant to compute the square root of a double precision
floating point number might be required to fulfill
sqrtSpec : (x : Double) → 0v x → (sqrt x ) ∗ (sqrt x ) = x
The specification sqrtSpec is logically equivalent to the
proposition “for all x of type Double , if x is nonnegative
then the square of sqrt x is equal to x”1. As above, 0v x and
(sqrt x )∗(sqrt x ) = x are values of type Type — in contrast
to 06 x and (sqrt x ) ∗ (sqrt x ) x which are Boolean val-
ues. They encode properties that depend on a specific value
x , which means they are dependent types.
The types of sqrt and sqrtSpec formulate a well-defined,
unambiguous task for the programmer. This is solved by pro-
viding implementations of sqrt and sqrtSpec that are syntac-
tically correct and total. In this case, the implementation of
sqrt is said to be verified or, equivalently, machine checked.
Notice that totality plays a crucial role in this context. Only
total implementations of sqrt and sqrtSpec are logically
equivalent to the proposition “for all x of type Double , if
x is nonnegative then the square of sqrt x is equal to x”.
Because sqrtSpec represents a property of sqrt , imple-
mentations of sqrtSpec will depend on a specific implemen-
tation of sqrt : one typically starts by implementing sqrt
and then tries to prove that it is correct by implementing
sqrtSpec. Implementations of sqrtSpec are typically derived
from pencil-and-paper proofs (that sqrt fulfills the property
encoded in the type of sqrtSpec) but dependently typed lan-
guages provide a lot of support to programmers: the Idris
system can “fill in” parts of the implementation of sqrtSpec
automatically.
Dependent types are also the key for expressing (per-
haps non-implementable) modeling assumptions or conjec-
tures and for formalizing domain-specific notions precisely.
In Sects. 2 to 6 we will not make explicit use of propositional
types. But propositional types are at the core of the theory
presented in Botta et al. (2017b, a) and are extensively used
there and in appendix A.
Another, perhaps unfamiliar, aspect of functional notations
is currying. In mathematics, a function of n > 1 arguments is
often implicitly converted to a function that takes as a sin-
gle argument one n−tuple. In Idris we instead use nested
function application. For example, if g is a general function
of two arguments it has type X → (Y → Z ) or sim-
ply X → Y → Z . If we apply g to just one argument
x : X , the resulting expression g x is still a function (of
type Y → Z ). This function can then be applied to some
value y : Y to obtain the result of g at x and y , written
(g x ) y , or simply g x y (because function application is left-
associative)2.
Notice that even though we do not use propositional types
in 2 to 6, most functions there are dependently typed. Thus,
for instance, in the signature of Control on page 528, the
type of the second argument, State t , depends on the value
1A more realistic specification would require that the square of
sqrt x be equal to x up to round-off errors, but we do not insist on
these details here.
2The idea that functions of more than one variable can always
be written as functions of just one variable (that return functions as
result) was originally proposed in Schönfinkel (1924) and popular-
ized by Haskell B. Curry (1958). The operation has since then been
referred to as currying. Its inverse is called uncurrying.
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of the first argument, t . We say that Control is dependently
typed (Norell, 2007; Brady, 2013, 2017).
Finally, the Botta et al. (2017b, a) theory applied in this
paper is available in the SequentialDecisionProblems com-
ponent of Botta (2016–2017). This is a git repository and it
is publicly available.
1.5 Outline
In the next section we introduce sequential emission prob-
lems and explain what it means for sequences of emission
policies to be optimal. We discuss the most important dif-
ferences between deterministic (certain) problems and emis-
sion problems under uncertainty. In Sect. 3 we discuss some
important traits of decision making under uncertainty. The
discussion is meant to prepare the specification of the styl-
ized emission problem presented in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5 we
study the impact of the uncertainties (1)–(3) on optimal pol-
icy sequences for our stylized problem. We draw preliminary
conclusions and outline future work in Sect. 6.
2 Sequential emission problems
As anticipated in the Introduction, in this work we study the
impact of uncertainties on optimal emission polices from a
control theoretical (as opposed to a game theoretical) per-
spective. Thus, the focus is on a single decision maker and on
how uncertainties affect the questions of when global emis-
sions shall be reduced and by how much as opposed to the
question of how emission reductions can actually be imple-
mented in a situation of mutual competition.
2.1 Sequential emission processes
If we focus the attention on a single decision maker and on
global emissions, sequential emission problems can be de-
scribed quite straightforwardly. At the core of any such prob-
lems is a sequential emission process (SEP). Informally, a se-
quential emission process can be described in terms of three
notions.
The first notion is that of a state. A state represents the
information available to the decision maker at a given deci-
sion step. Typically, the state of a decision process consists
of a number of aggregated measures. These include, for in-
stance, economic growth measures, GHG concentration mea-
sures and current emission level.
Often, the information available to the decision maker is
imperfect. For instance, for a given measure, the decision
maker might only be able to know a probability distribution
instead of a precise value. Another possibility is that the deci-
sion maker only knows that, e.g., a GDP measure lies within
certain bounds.
In the stylized sequential emission problem discussed in
Sect. 4, for example, the state consists of a tuple of four
values. These represent an amount of cumulated GHG emis-
sions, an implemented emission level, a level of availability
of efficient technologies for reducing GHG emissions and a
state of the world. In that problem, we will assume that the
decision maker can only distinguish between low and high
emissions
EmissionLevel = {Low ,High }
and available or unavailable efficient GHG emission reduc-
tion technologies
Technology = {Available,Unavailable }
Similarly, the state of the world will be just good or bad:
World = {Good ,Bad }
In realistic SEPs, decision makers typically have to select be-
tween more than two emission levels, efficient technologies
for reducing GHG emission are available to certain degrees
and the state of the world is slightly more multifaceted than
just good or bad.
The second notion that characterizes a sequential emission
process are the controls available to the decision maker. In
the context of climate change studies, controls are often re-
ferred to as options, actions or policies. To avoid confusion
with the notion of policy from Sect. 2.3 below, we will call
them controls.
In GHG emission problems, controls are often phrased in
terms of abatement levels or, equivalently, in terms of max-
imum GHG emissions growth rates. Thus, for instance, in
Webster (2002) and over the first decision step (for the time
interval between 2010 and 2019) controls can be one of eight
values: 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2 and 1.4. Here, a value of
0.4 represents a maximal emissions growth rate of 0.4%. In
the emission problem of Sect. 4, we will further oversimplify
this picture and only consider low and high GHG emissions.
Notice that, in general, not all controls are available in ev-
ery state and at every decision step. In other words, the abate-
ment levels that can be selected in a given state can depend
on that specific state. Thus, in our problem from Sect. 4, we
allow for the probability of implementing low (high) emis-
sions in the next period to depend on the current emission
level. As discussed in Webster (2008), the probability of im-
plementing low (high) emission levels in the next period is
higher if the current emissions are already low (high) than
if the current emissions are high (low). This kind of uncer-
tainty accounts for, among other things, the inertia of legisla-
tion and, of course, political instabilities. Thus, one can fully
describe the states and the controls of a sequential decision
process by defining two functions:
State : (t : N) → Type
Control : (t : N) → (x : State t) → Type
The interpretation is as follows: State t denotes the set of
states the decision maker can observe at the t-th decision
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step. Similarly, Control t x represents the controls that are
available to the decision maker at decision step t and in state
x . Remember that, as explained in Sect. 1.4, we denote func-
tion application by juxtaposition.
The third notion that characterizes a sequential emission
process is that of a transition function. Informally, transi-
tion functions describe how states change, at each decision
step, as a consequence of the controls selected by the de-
cision maker. Thus, in a deterministic decision process the
transition function has the type
next : (t : N) → (x : State t) → (y : Control t x ) →
State (t + 1)
Again, the interpretation is that for every t : N, x : State t
and y : Control t x , next t x y is “the” new state at deci-
sion step t +1. Notice that the time between two successive
decisions does not need to be constant. In a time-dependent
decision process, for instance, there could be a function
time : (t : N) → Real
with time (t+2)−time (t+1) 6= time (t+1)−time t for all
(or perhaps only for certain) values of t . In Webster (2002),
for instance, the author investigates two-step decision prob-
lems in which the first period extends over 10 years and the
second period extends over 80 years.
2.2 Sequential emission problems
A decision process becomes a decision problem when we
fully specify the costs and the benefits that are associated
with each transition. This can be done by defining a reward
function. A reward function is a function that, at each deci-
sion step, associates a value with every current state, selected
control and next state:
reward : (t : N) → (x : State t) → (y : Control t x ) →
(x ′ : State (t + 1)) → Val
As usual, we write reward in curried form and
reward t x y x ′ : Val denotes the reward of selecting
the control y in x at step t and ending up in x ′. Typically,
Val is R. An obvious question is: why shall reward explic-
itly depend on x ′? If x ′ = next t x y is “the” next state, it
seems that
(t : N) → (x : State t) → (y : Control t x ) → Val
would be a more appropriate type for reward . The reason
for including a new state x ′ in the signature of reward is
uncertainty, as we explain in the following paragraphs. We
have seen that, in deterministic decision processes, transition
functions have the type
(t : N) → (x : State t) → (y : Control t x ) →
State (t + 1)
What if the decision process is affected by uncertainties? If
selecting an abatement level in a given state has uncertain
outcomes (perhaps because of externalities or because the
consequences of implementing certain emission reductions
are not fully understood), it would be unsuitable to describe
the decision process in terms of a transition function that re-
turns a single next state. In this case, the transition function
should return a set of possible next states or a probability dis-
tribution of next states. As detailed in Botta et al. (2017b, a),
we can account for different kinds of uncertainties in deci-
sion processes with transition functions of the form
next : (t : N) → (x : State t) → (y : Control t x ) →
M (State (t + 1))
where M is a functor. It represents the type of uncertain-
ties underlying the decision process. For deterministic pro-
cesses, M is just the identity functor: M = Id . For stochas-
tic processes, M represents probability distributions. This is
the case considered in this work. Thus, we take M = Prob
where Prob X is the type of simple probability distributions3
on X . Therefore, next t x y is a probability distribution on
next states that is, a value of type Prob (State (t +1)). The
states in next t x y are those that can be obtained after de-
cision step t by selecting y in state x . Thus, in a stochastic
decision process, selecting a control does not yield a unique
next state but a whole set of possible next states with their
probabilities. Therefore, the reward function has to explicitly
depend on x ′ because this cannot be computed from the cur-
rent state x and the selected control y unambiguously. This
justifies the signature of reward as given above.
We can summarize the results obtained so far in the obser-
vation that stochastic sequential emission problems can be
specified in terms of four functions:
State : (t : N) → Type
Control : (t : N) → (x : State t) → Type
next : (t : N) → (x : State t) → (y : Control t x ) →
Prob (State (t + 1))
reward : (t : N) → (x : State t) → (y : Control t x ) →
(x ′ : State (t + 1)) → Val
We define these functions for our stylized emission problem
in Sect. 4. For the time being, we need to better understand
the decision problem that four such functions specify. This
is crucial for understanding the notions of policy and policy
sequence introduced in the next section.
The idea is that, for a fixed number of decision steps, the
decision maker seeks controls (emission levels) that maxi-
mize a sum of the rewards obtained over those steps. The em-
phasis here is on “a sum”: depending on the specific problem
at stake, future rewards might need to be discounted and the
way values of type Val are added up might not be completely
trivial. As explained in detail in Botta et al. (2017a), fully
specifying stochastic SDPs requires defining State , Control ,
next and reward and choosing a measure for weighting un-
certain outcomes. Formally, a measure is just a function that
reduces probability distribution on values to values
3In a nutshell, simple probability distributions are probability
distributions with finite support; see Botta et al. (2017a).
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meas : Prob Val → Val
The expected value function is probably the most widely
used measure in the study of stochastic SDPs. But other mea-
sures are possible. Depending on the specific problem and
the kind of uncertainties, other measures might be more suit-
able than the expected value. Thus, for instance, a risk-averse
decision maker might adopt a worst measure rather than re-
lying on the expected value. It is also conceivable, that a de-
cision maker adopts different measures of uncertainty at dif-
ferent decision steps. The theory summarized in appendix A
can be easily extended to cope with this situation. In Sect.
4, we walk the reader through the full specification of our
stylized emission problem, including uncertainty measures.
Solving SDPs is not trivial. For this, we instantiate the
generic backward induction algorithms presented in Botta
et al. (2017b, a). We do not need to discuss these methods
in detail here, but before we move to Sect. 4, it is important
to achieve a good understanding of what it means to solve a
stochastic SDP and what it means for sequences of policies
to be optimal.
In the rest of this section, we informally discuss the no-
tions of policy, policy sequence and optimality of policy se-
quences. We do so in the context of sequential emission prob-
lems but the ideas apply to SDPs in general. In Sect. 3, we
discuss a number of basic facts about sequential emission
problems. These, too, apply to sequential decision problems
without loss of generality.
2.3 Emission policies
We have pointed out that in stochastic sequential emission
problems, selecting an emission (abatement) level at a given
decision step and in a given state does not usually yield a
unique next state. Instead, we obtain a probability distribu-
tion on next states. The distribution encodes the uncertain-
ties associated with the decision process under study. Thus,
for instance, the decision maker might select to reduce emis-
sions by 2% but what actually gets implemented is a smaller
reduction, perhaps because of political inertia or as a conse-
quence of increased economic activity.
One consequence of uncertainties is that, even if decision
makers could fix a priori an emission schedule or path4, they
would not know the state obtained after a fixed number of de-
cision steps. This is, again, because each single step yields a
probability distribution on next states, not a single next state.
Thus, the best a decision maker can hope to obtain as a
solution to a stochastic sequential emission problem is a se-
quence of rules that indicate which control (abatement level)
to select for each decision step and, at that step, for each pos-
sible state.
In control theory, such “rules of action” are called poli-
cies. This is also the sense in which the word policy has been
4Strictly speaking, this is impossible because, as we have seen,
feasible emissions in a given state may depend on that state.
used in Botta et al. (2017b, a). The control theoretical notion
matches the notion of strategy in game theory quite well (Fu-
denberg and Tirole, 1991), but notice that in plain English
the term policy is ambiguous: sometimes it is used to denote
a plan (course) of action and sometimes a rule of action: see
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/policy.
Here we follow the control theory standard and policy se-
quences are just sequences of functions, one for each deci-
sion step. A sequence of policies for n +1 decision steps
consists of a policy p for the t-th decision step and of a pol-
icy sequence ps for n further steps. Formally we write
(p :: ps) : PolicySeq t (n + 1)
with p : Policy t (n+1) and ps : PolicySeq (t+1) n . Here,
:: is the operator that prepends a policy to a (possibly empty)
policy sequence, see appendix A and Sects. 3.5, 3.7 and 3.9
of Botta et al. (2017a). More formally, if ps = [p1,p2,p3 ]
then p :: ps = [p,p1,p2,p3 ] for all p : Policy t (n +1),
ps : PolicySeq (t +1) 3.
But what does it mean for a sequence of emission policies
to be optimal? The decision maker aims at maximizing the
sum of rewards over a fixed number of steps. Thus, (p :: ps)
is “an” optimal policy sequence for n +1 decision steps if
and only if no other sequence attains a higher sum of rewards
(over n +1 steps) for any given x : State t .
While fairly intuitive, formalizing this notion of optimal-
ity is not completely trivial. This is because, in a stochastic
emission problem, a selected abatement level does not entail
a unique next state, as explained above. Thus, for any possi-
ble next state (and therefore for any possible value of taking
n further decision steps with the policies of ps and starting
from that state) we have a corresponding reward and a prob-
ability. Such a probability distribution of rewards has to be
measured with meas in order to obtain the value of making
n +1 decision steps according to the policy p and the policy
sequence ps .
In appendix A, we discuss the computation of the value of
policy sequences in detail. In order to get an intuition of the
notion of optimality for policy sequences, it is sufficient to
recognize that one can precisely define a function
val : (x : State t) → PolicySeq t n → Val
In the theory of SDPs, val is called the value function. As
one would expect, val x ps is the value, in terms of the mea-
sured sum of possible rewards, of performing n decision
steps with the policy sequence ps and starting in state x . Cru-
cially, val x ps only depends on State , Ctrl , next , reward ,
meas and the rule for adding up rewards.
The value function allows us to give a precise meaning
to the intuitive notion of optimality of policy sequences dis-
cussed above. More importantly, it allows us to actually com-
pute optimal sequences of policies, at least for decision prob-
lems that fulfill certain natural conditions.
Again, a comprehensive discussion of the notion of op-
timality and the conditions under which optimal policy se-
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quences can be computed goes well beyond the scope of this
work. We refer the interested reader to appendix A and to
Botta et al. (2017a) and close this section by recalling an of-
ten neglected fact on decision making under uncertainty.
A fundamental difference between decision making under
deterministic transition functions and decision making under
uncertainty is that, in the latter case, regret cannot generally
be avoided. Here, by regret we mean a judgment in hind-
sight often triggered by an unlucky sequence of transitions.
Thus, for instance, a system for optimal routing may recom-
mend that a driver leave a highway in order to avoid an up-
coming traffic jam. On the alternative road, the driver may
get involved in a car accident and finally regret having left
the highway. Of course, the driver’s regret does not change
the fact that leaving the highway was a best choice (under
the problem’s reward function, measure of possible rewards,
etc.) at the point in time in which the choice had to be made.
In both the deterministic and in the uncertain case, the no-
tion of “best decision” is the same: at, for example, decision
step t and in x : State t , a best decision y∗ : Ctrl t x is a
decision that cannot be bettered (in terms of sum of possible
rewards) given the decision problem (that is, the functions
State , Ctrl , next and reward , the measure meas and the
rule for adding rewards) and a sequence of policies (optimal
or not) for taking n further decisions.
But when the outcome of a decision step is a probability
distribution on next states, we will have many possible tra-
jectories of length n +1 starting in x instead of just one. In
general, there is nothing preventing some of these trajecto-
ries from containing states that make any best decision in
x regrettable. This is true even for trajectories of length 1,
which is for n = 0.
3 Logical consequences of SEPs
In this section we discuss some logical consequences of the
notions introduced in 2. A first consequence of the notion of
optimal policy sequence is that optimal decisions may vary
over time: a best control at a given step does not need to
be a best control at a subsequent (or previous) step even if
the decision maker observes the same state at both decision
steps. There is nothing worrying in this fact: the possible time
inconsistency of optimal policies and Bellman’s principle of
optimality (Bellman, 1957) are perfectly consistent!
Another consequence of the notions introduced in Sect.
2 is that exploiting available information is crucial in de-
cision making under uncertainty. We have seen that, under
uncertainty, regret cannot in general be avoided. In spite of
this fact, the notion of optimal policy sequence and of “best”
decision are both clear and compelling: optimal policy se-
quences for SEPs provide decision makers with rules for
selecting emission levels that, at any decision step, cannot
be bettered given the information available to the decision
maker at that step.
The crucial point is exploiting the information available
at a given decision step. As seen in Sect. 2, this information
is coded in the notion of State and the mechanisms for ex-
ploiting such information are policies or action rules. Taking
decisions on the basis of optimal policies is in most cases bet-
ter than selecting controls according to fixed (ex ante) action
plans. This is because, in contrast to fixed action plans, poli-
cies provide an action for every possible state that can even-
tually be reached (ex post) at a given decision step. They ac-
count for all the information available to the decision maker
at that step. Further, optimal policies entail actions that can-
not be bettered.
In Sect. 5, we discuss optimal policies for the emission
problem of Sect. 4. Because these policies are computed us-
ing the verified framework presented in Botta et al. (2017b,
a), we know (in spite of the uncertainties affecting emission
problems, for certain!) that the conclusions that we draw for
our uncertain emission problem are logical consequences of
the problem specification. Computing optimal policies with
a verified implementation is crucial because, in contrast to
other properties of solutions to computational problems, op-
timality cannot in general be established by testing. This is a
well-known case in which proving is difficult but still easier
than testing; see Ionescu and Jansson (2013).
A third logical consequence of the notions introduced in
the previous section is that best controls and optimal poli-
cies are not generally unique. In Sect. 5 we discuss a prob-
lem setup in which both increasing and decreasing emissions
are optimal. When applying optimal control to inform pol-
icy advice and decision making, it is important to keep in
mind that optimal policies are not necessarily unique: dif-
ferent optimal emission sequences can yield different sets of
possible emission paths. Decision makers might not be able
to distinguish them in terms of measures of possible sums
of rewards, but they still might have reasons to prefer certain
optimal emission policies to others. For instance, precaution-
ary approaches might lead decision makers to prefer optimal
policies that entail low risk levels to high risk optimal poli-
cies.
Another logical consequence of decision making under
uncertainty is that the value of policies depends not only on
the problem-specific reward function and on the way rewards
are added (e.g. via discounting) but also on how the decision
maker weights uncertain outcomes. This is captured by the
measure function meas . Different measures reflect different
attitudes or dispositions, e.g., towards risk.
As explained in Ionescu (2009), decision makers are free
to choose whatever measure they like as far as it fulfills a
monotonicity condition. Informally, this condition says that
if one increases theVal values of a probability distribution by
any arbitrary amount (leaving their probabilities unchanged),
its measure shall not decrease (see appendix A). The ex-
pected value, in much the same way as worst and best case
measures, fulfill this condition. But notice that, as shown at
pp. 112–116 of Ionescu (2009) in the context of a formal-
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ization of vulnerability notions, measures that pick up the
most (least) probable Val value of a probability distribution
do violate the monotonicity condition. It is a responsibility
of scientific advisors to make sure that decision making is
informed by meaningful, monotonic measures.
4 A stylized sequential emission problem
In this and in the next section, we study how optimal se-
quences of GHG emission policies are affected by 1) uncer-
tainty about the implementability of decisions on GHG emis-
sion reductions, 2) uncertainty about the availability of effi-
cient technologies for reducing GHG emissions and 3) uncer-
tainty about the implications of exceeding a critical threshold
of cumulated GHG emissions.
As anticipated in the Introduction, we first specify a styl-
ized sequential emission problem that accounts for all three
sources of uncertainty and yet is simple enough to support
an investigation of the logical consequences of different as-
sumptions on such uncertainties. In Sect. 5 we discuss the
optimal policies obtained for our stylized problem under dif-
ferent assumptions.
We specify our stylized emission problem by instantiating
the theory for SDPs summarized in appendix A. Technically,
this is done by defining all the undefined variables (filling
the holes) in the modules that implement the theory. For the
implementation provided in the SequentialDecisionProblems
component of Botta (2016–2017), these are the holes in
– CoreTheory, FullTheory, Utils;
– CoreTheoryOptDefaults, FullTheoryOptDefaults, Fast-
StochasticDefaults;
– TabBackwardsInduction; and
– TabBackwardsInductionOptDefaults.
For a detailed discussion on how to specify an SDP, see Botta
et al. (2017a). A complete implementation of our specifica-
tion is available in applications/EmissionsGame2. In the rest
of this section, we skip most technical details and focus on
the specification of the emission problem from an applica-
tional perspective.
As anticipated in the Introduction, we specify our stylized
emission problem as a stochastic SDP. Thus, M = Prob. We
have to define the four functions State , Control , next and
reward introduced in Sect. 2. We start by defining the con-
trols, i.e., the options available to the decision maker.
4.1 Controls
In our stylized emission problem, at each decision step the
decision maker can only select between low and high GHG
emissions. Thus,
Control t x = LowHigh
where LowHigh is a type inhabited by only two values: Low
and High . The idea is that low emissions, if actually im-
plemented, increase the cumulated GHG emissions less than
high emissions.
4.2 States
At each decision step, the decision maker has to choose be-
tween low and high emission levels on the basis of four
values: a measure of cumulated GHG emissions, the cur-
rent emission level (itself either low or high), the availability
of effective technologies for reducing GHG emissions and
a “state of the world”. Effective technologies for reducing
GHG emissions can be either available or unavailable. The
state of the world can be either good or bad:
State t = (CumulatedEmissions t ,LowHigh,
AvailableUnavailable,GoodBad)
The idea is that the decision process starts with zero cumu-
lated emissions, high emission levels, unavailable GHG tech-
nologies and with the world in a good state. In these condi-
tions, the probability for the world to turn to the bad state is
low. But if the cumulated emissions increase beyond a fixed
critical threshold, the probability that the world becomes bad
increases. If the world is in the bad state, there is no chance
to come back to the good state. Similarly, the probability that
effective technologies for reducing GHG emissions will be-
come available increases after a fixed number of decision
steps. Once available, effective technologies stay available
forever.
In a realistic problem, the capability of actually imple-
menting a decision on a given GHG emission level typically
depends on a variety of factors. In our stylized problem, we
follow Webster (2002, 2008) and focus on the uncertainties
about the implementability of decisions on GHG emission
reductions that come from inertia: implementing low emis-
sions is easier when low emission measures are already in
place than when the current emissions are high. Similarly,
implementing high emission measures is easier if the current
emissions are high than under low emissions regulations.
4.3 Transition function
We have defined State t to be a tuple of values representing
cumulated GHG emissions, the current emission level, the
availability of effective technologies for reducing GHG emis-
sions and the state of the world at decision step t . As our styl-
ized emission problem is stochastic, its transition function at
decision step t yields a probability distribution on values of
type State (t +1).
The idea is that low emission levels leave the cumulated
emissions unchanged and high emissions increase the cumu-
lated emissions. Without loss of generality, we can take such
an increase to be 1. We have mentioned that the probability
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of the state of the world to become bad depends on a critical
cumulated emissions threshold. Let’s call this threshold crE
crE : Double
and let pS1 and pS2 represent the probabilities of staying in
a good world when the cumulated emissions are smaller than
or equal to crE and greater than crE , respectively:
pS1 : NonNegDouble
pS2 : NonNegDouble
Thus, the probabilities of getting into a bad world below and
above the threshold are 1− pS1 and 1− pS2 , respectively.
As a sanity check, we require pS2 to be less than or equal to
pS1 .
Next, we have to specify the uncertainties about the avail-
ability of efficient technologies for reducing GHG emissions.
This, too, can be done in terms of a critical number of deci-
sion steps
crN : N
and of two probabilities: the probability of effective tech-
nologies for reducing GHG emissions becoming available
when the number of decision steps is below or at crN and
the probability for the case in which t is above crN :
pA1 : NonNegDouble
pA2 : NonNegDouble
Also for these probabilities we need a sanity check: pA1
shall be at most equal to pA2 . Finally, we have to specify
the uncertainties about the implementability of decisions on
GHG emission reductions. Following the discussion in the
previous section, we do so in terms of four conditional proba-
bilities. These are the probability of implementing low emis-
sion measures when the current emissions measures are low
and low emissions are selected pLL, the probability of imple-
menting low emission measures when the current emissions
measures are high and low emissions are selected pLH and
their counterparts for high emissions:
pLL : NonNegDouble
pLH : NonNegDouble
pHL : NonNegDouble
pHH : NonNegDouble
Also for these probabilities, we require two sanity checks
to be fulfilled: pLH shall not exceed pLL and pHL shall
not exceed pHH . With these parameters in place, the tran-
sition function next can be implemented by cases. For
a full implementation, we refer the reader to applica-
tions/EmissionsGame2. As an example, we discuss here the
case in which the current state is
x = (e,High,Unavailable,Good)
the decision maker has opted for low emissions, e is smaller
than or equal to crE and t is smaller than or equal to crN . In
this case, the result of next t x Low is a probability distribu-
tion with the following assignments:
(e, L, U ,G)⇒ pLH ∗ (1− pA1 ) ∗ pS1
(e + 1,H ,U ,G)⇒ (1− pLH ) ∗ (1− pA1 ) ∗ pS1
(e, L, A,G) ⇒ pLH ∗ pA1 ∗ pS1
(e + 1,H ,A,G) ⇒ (1− pLH ) ∗ pA1 ∗ pS1
(e, L, U ,B)⇒ pLH ∗ (1− pA1 ) ∗ (1− pS1 )
(e + 1,H ,U ,B)⇒ (1− pLH ) ∗ (1− pA1 ) ∗ (1− pS1 )
(e, L, A,B) ⇒ pLH ∗ pA1 ∗ (1− pS1 )
(e + 1,H ,A,B) ⇒ (1− pLH ) ∗ pA1 ∗ (1− pS1 )
Here L, H , U , A, G and B are aliases for Low , High ,
Unavailable , Available , Good and Bad , respectively. No-
tice that the marginal probability of the new state to en-
ter a bad world is 1− pS1 , as one would expect. Simi-
larly, the probability of effective technologies for reducing
GHG emissions becoming available is pA1 (we are consid-
ering the case t 6 crN ) and the probability of implementing
low emission measures is pLH as the current emission lev-
els are high. Similar assignments hold for x = (e,H ,U ,B),
x = (e,H ,A,G), etc.
4.4 Reward function
To complete the specification of our stylized emission prob-
lem, we have to define the reward function and the measure
meas : Prob Val → Val
according to which the decision maker weights uncertain
outcomes. Unless stated otherwise, we will take Val to
be NonNegDouble (nonnegative, double precision, floating
point numbers) and meas to be the expected value function.
In this section we focus attention on the reward function
reward : (t : N) → (x : State t) → (y : Control t x ) →
(x ′ : State (t + 1)) → Val
The idea is that being in a good world yields one unit of ben-
efits per step and being in a bad world yields lower benefits.
We can formalize this idea by introducing a dimensionless
number
b : NonNegDouble
which represents the ratio between the step benefits in a bad
world and the step benefits in a good world. It goes with-
out saying that a constant ratio is a very crude approximation
that can only be justified in a stylized problem. In sequen-
tial emission problems aiming at informing decision making
under realistic conditions, the costs and the benefits of not
transgressing global emission thresholds are likely to be time
dependent and have to be carefully estimated, e.g., by run-
ning global climate models coupled with economic models
and perhaps energy models. Unless otherwise stated, we will
take b to be equal to 0.5. Of course, we require the b ratio to
be smaller than or equal to 1.
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Emitting GHGs also brings step benefits, e.g. by support-
ing economic growth. These can be represented as a fraction
of the step benefits of being in a good world. Moreover, low
emissions bring lower benefits (higher costs) than high emis-
sions and reducing emissions when effective technologies are
unavailable costs more than reducing emissions when such
technologies are available. We can summarize this state of
affairs in terms of three dimensionless numbers. A first num-
ber represents the ratio between the step benefits of low emis-
sions and the step benefits in a good world when effective
technologies for reducing GHG emissions are unavailable
lu : NonNegDouble
A second number represents the same ratio when effective
technologies are available
la : NonNegDouble
Finally, a third number represents the ratio between the step
benefits obtained through high emissions and the step bene-
fits in good worlds
h : NonNegDouble
We require lu , la and h to be smaller than or equal to 1, lu
to be smaller than or equal to la and the latter to be smaller
than or equal to h . With these notions in place, we can eas-
ily implement the reward function of our stylized emission
problem. The idea is that the rewards only depend on the
next state (the state during the period starting with the cur-
rent decision) and not on the current state or on the selected
control. We have eight cases with the following assignments
(e,H ,U ,G)⇒ 1 + h
(e,H ,U ,B)⇒ b + h
(e,H ,A, G)⇒ 1 + h
(e,H ,A, B)⇒ b + h
(e,L, U ,G)⇒ 1 + lu
(e,L, U ,B)⇒ b + lu
(e,L, A, G)⇒ 1 + la
(e,L, A, B)⇒ b + la
To sum up, the parameters that define the reward function of
our stylized emission problem, their default values and sanity
constraints are collected in Table 1.
Completing the specification of our problem and comput-
ing optimal sequences of emission policies requires filling
in some more details. These are annotated and discussed in
applications/EmissionsGame2.
They are pertinent to the notions of reachability, viability,
finiteness and decidability. These notions are crucial for un-
derstanding the problem of computing optimal policies under
uncertainty but their discussion would go well beyond the
scope of this work. We refer the interested reader to Botta
et al. (2017a).
parameter value constraint
b 0.5 b 6 1
h 0.3 h 6 1
la 0.2 la 6 h
lu 0.1 lu 6 la
Table 1.Reward function parameters, default values and constraints
5 Optimal policies
In this section we discuss optimal emission policies for the
stylized emission problem of Sect. 4 and study the impact of
uncertainties (1)–(3) on such policies. As explained in Sect.
3, the computed policies have been machine checked to be
optimal. Thus, they only depend on our problem specifica-
tion. This is simple enough to allow for the deduction some
general properties that optimal decisions — decisions taken
according to optimal policy sequences — have to fulfill.
A first one is that no optimal policy sequence can require
the selection of low emissions when the state of the world is
bad. This is because, as posited in Sect. 4, there is no way to
make a transition from a bad world to a good world and, in a
bad world in much the same way as in a good world, higher
emissions bring more emission benefits. In other words, re-
ducing emissions can only pay off if it makes it possible (al-
beit not certain) to avoid transitions to a bad world, if perhaps
only for a limited number of steps. Once such a transition has
taken place, reducing emissions is pointless. A consequence
of this fact is that in the last step it is always optimal to select
high emissions. In a realistic emission problem, one could
easily prevent this situation by introducing a suitable “unsus-
tainability” penalty in the reward function at the last decision
step.
We do not need to deal with such complications here but it
is perhaps useful to point out that very often, seemingly natu-
ral and innocuous assumptions (in this case, that the number
of decision steps is finite and known to the decision maker)
can have nontrivial consequences for “best” decisions. Thus,
for instance, the rate at which rewards are discounted in inte-
grated assessment models of climate change typically has a
severe impact on optimal emission policies. Thus, in policy
advice, it is crucial to apply theories that require all assump-
tions to be made explicit. This was one of the guiding crite-
ria in developing the theory of policy advice and avoidability
discussed in Botta et al. (2017a).
Unless specified, we consider nine decision steps with
crE = 4 and crN = 2. Thus, it takes at least five decision
steps (and five periods with high emissions) to achieve states
in which the sum of the cumulated emissions exceeds crE ,
and therefore the probability of a transition to a bad world
increases from pS1 to pS2 . Similarly, with crN = 2, it takes
three decision steps to achieve states in which the probability
that effective technologies for reducing GHG emissions will
become available increases from pA1 to pA2 .
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In other worlds, if pS1 = pA1 = 0 and pS2 = pA2 = 1,
effective technologies will be available (with certainty) after
four decision steps. And after five periods of high emissions,
a transition to a bad world will occur. This is the deterministic
base case studied in the next section.
5.1 The deterministic base case
Before studying the impact of uncertainties on optimal poli-
cies, we consider the certain case. Beside pS1 = pA1 = 0
and pS2 = pA2 = 1 we also have pLL= pLH = pHL=
pHH = 1. Thus, there is no uncertainty about the imple-
mentability of emission measures: decisions on reducing or
increasing emissions are implemented with probability 1.
Notice that the complete absence of uncertainties implies
that, for any initial state and policy sequence (optimal or
not) there is exactly one possible state–control trajectory:
namely, that determined by that policy sequence. Thus, for
instance, if we start in (0,H,U,G) (zero cumulated emis-
sions, high emissions, unavailable efficient technologies and
a good world) and adopt the policy of constantly increasing
emissions, we obtain the state–control trajectory
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H),
((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),H),
((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H),
((9,H,A,B), )]
with probability 1. The sum of rewards associated with this
“certain” trajectory is 9.7: these result from five periods in a
good world (step benefits equal to 1), four periods in a bad
world (step benefits 0.5) and nine periods of high emissions
(emission benefits per step of 0.3). As expected, efficient
technologies for reducing GHG emissions become available
at decision step four (after four decisions) and the transition
to a bad world takes place after five periods of high emis-
sions and six decisions. We can do a bit better by selecting
low emissions at every step. In this case the state–control tra-
jectory is
[((0,H,U,G),L), ((0,L,U,G),L), ((0,L,U,G),L),
((0,L,U,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L),
((0,L,A,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L),
((0,L,A,G), )]
What are optimal policy sequences like in the certain case?
The intuition is that, in at least four decision steps, emissions
should be high. This yields higher rewards at no risk of get-
ting into a bad world. One would also expect that lower emis-
sions are selected (and implemented with certainty) in states
in which efficient technologies for reducing GHG emissions
are available. The trajectory associated with an optimal se-
quence of policies
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H),
((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),L), ((4,L,A,G),L),
((4,L,A,G),L), ((4,L,A,G),L), ((4,L,A,G),H),
((5,H,A,G), )]
shows that such intuition is correct. The sum of rewards as-
sociated with this trajectory is 11.3. By selecting low emis-
sions starting from the fifth decision step, the optimal policy
guarantees that the world stays in the good state. At the last
decision step, high emissions are selected, as anticipated.
The computation supports the intuition that, in a world
without uncertainties, it is best to delay emission reductions
until efficient technologies become available. Of course, this
requires knowing the critical number of decision steps crN .
5.2 The impact of uncertainties about the
implementability of decisions on emission
reductions.
What happens to optimal policies if we factor in uncertainties
about the implementability of decisions on emission reduc-
tions or increases?
Let’s consider the case in which the probability of imple-
menting low emission measures in the next period is higher
if the current emissions are already low than in the case in
which the current emissions are high. Conversely, the prob-
ability of implementing high emissions in the next period is
higher if the current emissions are high. In other words, we
have pLH <pLL and pHL<pHH instead of pLL= pLH =
pHL= pHH = 1. Specifically, consider optimal policies for
the case pLL= pHH = 0.9 and pLH = pHL= 0.7.
Our decision problem is now no longer deterministic.
Thus, a policy (optimal or not) entails a whole set of possi-
ble future state–control trajectories. More precisely, we have
29 = 512 possible trajectories: we take nine decision step
and, at every decision step and no matter whether we select
low or high emissions, we have two possible outcomes. Now,
the “business as usual” policy of always selecting high emis-
sions yields the trajectory
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H),
((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),H),
((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H),
((9,H,A,B), )]
with probability 0.99 ≈ 0.387. The two next most likely tra-
jectories are
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H),
((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),H),
((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H),
((8,L,A,B), )]
and
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H),
((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H), ((4,L,A,G),H),
((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H),
((8,H,A,B), )]
with probabilities of 0.043 and 0.033. The expected sum of
rewards (remember that meas is the expected value function)
is 9.904. The computed optimal policies for the same prob-
lem yield the trajectory
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[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),L),
((2,L,U,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),L),
((2,L,A,G),H), ((3,H,A,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),
((5,H,A,G), )]
with probability 0.234. The two next most likely trajectories
are
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),L),
((3,H,U,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L),
((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),
((5,H,A,G), )]
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),L),
((2,L,U,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),L),
((2,L,A,G),H), ((2,L,A,G),H), ((3,H,A,G),H),
((4,H,A,G), )]
both with probability 0.078. The expected sum of rewards
is 11.085. Notice that, under uncertainties about the imple-
mentability of decisions on emission reductions or increases,
optimal policies dictate more precautious best decisions: in-
stead of waiting for efficient technologies for reducing GHG
emissions to become available, optimal decision making re-
quires starting to reduce emissions after only two decision
steps.
The fact that higher uncertainties about the implementabil-
ity of decisions on emission reductions or increases lead to
more precautionary optimal policies is confirmed by com-
puting optimal policies for the case pLL= pHH = 0.7 and
pLH = pHL= 0.5. In this case optimal policies dictate low
emissions in the first decision steps for the three most likely
possible trajectories. This is still true in the limit pLL=
pHH = 0.5+  for > 0,  −→ 0 although the advantage of
optimal policies against nonoptimal policies (e.g., “business
as usual” policies) in terms of expected rewards tends to zero
as  goes to zero.
In the limit case in which the decision maker has no
power to enforce emission decisions for the next period and
pLL= pHH = pLH = pHL= 0.5, any policy sequence is
optimal, as one would expect. As discussed in Sect. 3, this
is an example of nonuniqueness of optimal policies.
5.3 The impact of uncertainties about the availability of
efficient technologies for reducing GHG emissions
What if the probability of efficient technologies becoming
available after three decision steps is less than 1 and there is
a small but nonzero probability that such technologies will
become available before three decision steps?
With the same uncertainties as in Sect. 5.2 (pLL= pHH =
0.9 and pLH = pHL= 0.7) and with pA1 and pA2 equal to
0.1 and 0.9 instead of 0 and 1, we now have 2n ∗(n+1) pos-
sible trajectories5 for n decision steps. Thus, for n = 9, we
5At each decision step, a possible state in which efficient tech-
nologies are not available, a U state, entails four possible next
states: two in which efficient technologies are available and two in
have 5120 trajectories instead of just 512. The “business as
usual” policy of always selecting high emissions yields the
same most likely trajectory and a slightly higher expected
sum of rewards: 9.91. The computed optimal policies also
yield the same most likely trajectories as in Sect. 5.2 although
with lower probabilities. The expected sum of rewards is
11.102.
Thus, perhaps surprisingly, uncertainties on the availabil-
ity of efficient technologies for reducing GHG emissions
have little impact on optimal decisions, at least when com-
pared to the impact of uncertainties about the implementabil-
ity of decisions on emission reductions.
5.4 The impact of uncertainties about the implications of
exceeding a critical threshold of cumulated GHG
emissions.
So far we have assumed that if the critical cumulated GHG
emissions threshold crE was exceeded, the world would turn
to a bad state with probability 1. Conversely, for cumulated
emissions below the crE , the probability of a transition into
a bad world was zero.
What if we assume a 10% probability of turning to a bad
world for cumulated emissions below the crE and a 10%
chance of staying in a good world above the critical thresh-
old?
Adding these uncertainties to the certain “base” case yields
10 possible trajectories. These correspond to transitions to a
bad world in the first through ninth decision step. In this sce-
nario, always selecting high emissions yields the trajectory
of the certain case
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H),
((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),H),
((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H),
((9,H,A,B), )]
with probability 0.531. The expected sum of possible re-
wards is lower than in the certain case: 9.076. Similarly, op-
timal policies under uncertainty about the implications of ex-
ceeding crE yield the possible trajectory
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H),
((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),L), ((4,L,A,G),L),
((4,L,A,G),L), ((4,L,A,G),L), ((4,L,A,G),H),
((5,H,A,G), )]
with probability 0.387. In the certain case, this was also the
(certain) optimal trajectory. The expected sum of possible re-
wards is 9.731, which is much lower than in the certain case
but still better than for the “business as usual” policies.
which they are not. A possible state in which efficient technolo-
gies are available (an A state) only entails two possible next states
because once technologies become available they stay available in
all possible future states. Thus, after one decision step, we have
two possible U states and two possible A states. After two decision
steps, we have four possible U states and eight possible A states.
After three decision steps we have eight possible U states and 24
possible A states. And so on.
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These results suggest that, as for the case of uncertainties
about the availability of efficient technologies, uncertainties
about the implications of exceeding crE do not affect opti-
mal policies substantially: the intuition that lower emissions
should be selected (and implemented with certainty) in states
in which efficient technologies for reducing GHG emissions
are available still holds.
Adding uncertainties about the implications of exceeding
crE on top of uncertainties about the implementability of
decisions and uncertainties about the availability of efficient
technologies also does not substantially change the under-
standing obtained in Sects. 5.2 and 5.3. But it brings some
new unexpected results.
With pLL= pHH = 0.9, pLH = pHL= 0.7, pA1 = 0.1,
pA2 = 0.9 and pS1 = 0.9, pS2 = 0.1 obtains 51200 possi-
ble trajectories. For “business as usual” policies, the most
likely is the usual
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H),
((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),H),
((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H),
((9,H,A,B), )]
with probability 0.135. Remember that in the absence of un-
certainty about the implications of exceeding crE , the three
most likely trajectories were
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),L),
((2,L,U,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),L),
((2,L,A,G),H), ((3,H,A,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),
((5,H,A,G), )]
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),L),
((3,H,U,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L),
((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),
((5,H,A,G), )]
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),L),
((2,L,U,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),L),
((2,L,A,G),H), ((2,L,A,G),H), ((3,H,A,G),H),
((4,H,A,G), )]
with associated rewards 11.2, 11.3 and 11.1 and probabili-
ties 0.154, 0.051 and 0.051. The expected sum of possible
rewards was 11.102. Adding 10% uncertainty about the im-
plications of exceeding crE yields
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H),
((3,H,U,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L),
((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),
((5,H,A,G),)]
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,B),H), ((2,H,U,B),H),
((3,H,U,B),H), ((4,H,A,B),H), ((5,H,A,B),H),
((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H),
((9,H,A,B), )]
[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,B),H),
((3,H,U,B),H), ((4,H,A,B),H), ((5,H,A,B),H),
((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H),
((9,H,A,B), )]
with expected rewards 11.3, 7.2 and 7.7 and probabilities
0.059, 0.025 and 0.023, respectively. The expected sum of
possible rewards is 9.543. Now, optimal policies for the most
likely trajectory require postponing emission reductions by
one step: low emissions are selected starting from t = 3 in-
stead of t = 2.
Notice that the optimal policies require constant high
emissions both for the second and for the third most likely
trajectories! This is because in these trajectories the world
enters a bad state right after the first decision step (second
trajectory) or after the second decision step (third trajectory).
Indeed, the rewards associated with the second and the third
trajectories (7.2 and 7.7, respectively) are significantly lower
than the rewards associated with the most likely trajectory
(11.3).
Notice also that, even though the probability of transition
into a bad world is only 0.1 for cumulated emissions below
crE , the trajectory that entails such a transition immediately
after the first decision step (the second one) is more likely to
occur than the trajectory in which the world stays in the good
state for the first period (third one).
This seems at the first sight counterintuitive. But it can
easily be verified by inspection6 and is in fact easily ex-
plained: the crucial point is that the probability of entering
a bad world at the first decision step (and then necessarily
staying in a bad world) is 0.1. By contrast, the probability
of staying in a good world for one period and then getting
into a bad world is, ceteris paribus, 0.9 * 0.1. This difference
makes the second trajectory more likely than the third one.
Of course, both trajectories are much less likely than the first
one as in the cases discussed in Sects. 5.2 and 5.3.
6 Conclusions
We have studied the impact of uncertainties about 1) the im-
plementability of decisions on emission reductions, 2) the
availability of technologies for reducing emissions and 3) the
implications of exceeding a critical threshold of cumulated
emissions on optimal emission policies in a stylized sequen-
tial emission problem.
In a nutshell, the results presented in Sect. 5 support
the conclusion that uncertainties about the implementabil-
ity of decisions on emission reductions (or increases) call
for more precautionary policies. By contrast, uncertainties
about the implications of exceeding critical cumulated emis-
sion thresholds tend to make precautionary policies subopti-
mal.
More specifically, the results of Sect. 5 suggest that uncer-
tainties about the implementability of decisions on emission
6Given the probabilities pS1 , pS2 , pA1 , pA2 , pLL, pLH ,
pHL and pHH as above, the probability of a given trajectory is just
the product of the probabilities of the corresponding transitions.
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reductions and, to a more limited extent, uncertainties about
the implications of exceeding critical cumulated emission
thresholds have a greater impact on optimal emissions poli-
cies than uncertainties on the availability of effective tech-
nologies for reducing GHG emissions.
This is at the first glance perhaps a bit surprising but ac-
tually quite understandable: if decisions on emissions (no
matter whether reductions or increases) can be implemented
with certainty, it is obviously better to delay necessary but
costly reductions until available technologies make abate-
ments cheaper. This holds as far as delays do not lead global
emissions to exceed the critical threshold crE .
But if we cannot be sure that future decisions will be im-
plemented with certainty – for instance, because of inertia
in legislation or political instability – than starting to imple-
ment emission reductions (or trying to do so) sooner yields
higher rewards. This is a typical case in which precautionary
policies are optimal.
How much earlier it is optimal to undertake costly abate-
ment steps (rather than waiting for technological innovation
to make emission reductions cheaper) very much depends on
the rewards structure and on the uncertainties of the specific
emission problem at stake.
Perhaps more surprisingly, the results of Sect. 5.4 suggest
that the optimal time for starting to reduce emissions also
depends on the level of uncertainty about the implications
of trespassing critical thresholds of cumulated emissions. As
these uncertainties increase, precautionary policies become
suboptimal. In other words, the better we can estimate the
consequences of exceeding critical thresholds, the more it
pays off to adopt precautionary policies.
Two caveats are in order here. First, while the results pre-
sented in Sect. 5 are rigorous (the optimal emission policies
our conclusions rely upon have been machine checked), the
stylized emission problem for which we have computed such
policies is defined in terms of a small but not empty set of
parameters. In particular, the value of policy sequences (opti-
mal or not) crucially depends on the problem rewards, which
means on the values of the four parameters b, h , la and lu;
see Table 1 at the end of Sect. 4. Are our conclusions only
valid for these specific values?
Apart from substantiating our findings with a careful (but
necessarily prohibitively expensive) sensitivity analysis, we
can try to achieve a better analytical understanding of the
impact of the above parameters on optimal policy sequences.
From the definition of the reward function given at the end
of Sect. 4, we can immediately deduce that at each decision
step the costs of selecting low emissions are greater than or
equal to
h − la
Remember that lu is the ratio between the benefits of low
emissions and the benefits of being in a good world when
effective technologies for reducing GHG emissions are un-
available. Similarly, la is the ratio between the benefits of
low emissions and the benefits of being in a good world when
effective technologies are available. As summarized in Table
1, we require lu to be smaller than or equal to la (effective
technologies for reducing GHG emissions diminish the costs
of low emissions) and la to be smaller than or equal to h (low
emissions cost more than high emissions). Thus, the differ-
ence between h and la represents the minimal costs (e.g.,
due to missed growth, higher GHG filtering and sequestra-
tion costs, taxes, etc.) implied by low emission measures. By
contrast, the costs (damages) that can be avoided by keep-
ing the world in a good state are expressed in our stylized
decision problem by the difference
1− b
Thus, if 1−b is smaller than or equal to h− la , selecting low
emissions never pays off. Therefore
bcr = 1− (h − la)
is an important threshold in the parameter space of our emis-
sion problem: for values of b between bcr and 1, selecting
low emissions cannot be optimal. In this interval, optimal
policies will recommend high GHG emissions. Are there
other important thresholds in the problem’s parameter space?
At this point, we do not know. We have computed optimal
policy sequences for a few values of b between 0.5 and 0.91.
These results confirm the analysis and support the conclusion
presented above.
The second caveat is that the results presented in Sect.
5.4 offer a rather limited view of the impacts of uncertain-
ties about the implications of exceeding critical thresholds of
cumulated GHG emissions on optimal policies. It is true that
we have performed more assessments (with probabilities of
5% and 20% of turning to a bad world for cumulated emis-
sions below crE ; not reported in Sect. 5.4) and that these
support the conclusions drawn above.
However, our statistics on the set of possible trajectories
associated with a given policy sequence (optimal or not)
have been throughout Sect. 5 very rudimentary: we have only
assessed the three most likely trajectories, their values and
probabilities, and the expected sum of rewards.
In studying the impacts of uncertainties about the impli-
cations of exceeding critical thresholds, we have to do with
51200 possible trajectories for every single policy sequence.
In this case, more comprehensive statistics would probably
be called for. This is computationally challenging; see Sec-
tion 7.
Thus, the conclusions that we can draw from the results
of Sect. 5 are necessarily preliminary. Notice, however, that
they are consistent with the analysis reported in Webster
(2008) for a two-step decision problem. We are not aware
of studies in which the impact of uncertainties on optimal
emission policies have been studied systematically for more
than two decision steps.
It is probably also fair to point out that, as uncertainties
on the implementability of emissions decisions increase and
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(therefore) optimal policies require more and more precau-
tionary approaches, the advantages (in terms of rewards) of
earlier emission reductions against delays vanish: in the limit
case in which political decisions have no bearing on the mea-
sures actually implemented, all policies are optimal.
It should also be kept in mind that in our idealized prob-
lem, we have kept the cumulated emission threshold crE
and the critical number of decision steps for technological
innovation crN fixed. In increasing the uncertainty about
the availability of technologies for reducing emissions and
about the implications of exceeding crE , we have modified
the probability distributions below and above crN and crE
symmetrically. Thus, taking as a reference the certain case,
we have increased the probability that efficient technologies
will become available before crN steps from zero to 0.1 and
at the same time decreased the probability after crN from 1
to 0.9. This is similar for uncertainties on the consequences
of exceeding crE . It goes without saying that shifting crN
and crE does indeed have a strong impact on optimal poli-
cies.
Thus, the results presented in Sect. 5 do not imply that im-
proving the accuracy of crN and crE estimates is not worth
the efforts. But they suggest that obtaining more realistic es-
timates for the probability of effective technologies for re-
ducing GHG becoming available before and after a critical
date is perhaps not as crucial (for computing optimal emis-
sion policies for realistic decision problems) as improving
our understanding of the implementability of decisions on
emission reductions or increases.
Obtaining plausible estimates for the probabilities of being
able to implement decisions on emissions reductions or in-
creases naturally brings a political perspective into the prob-
lem of computing plausible optimal emission policies.
7 Future work
Realistic GHG emission problems involve more than one de-
cision maker (countries) in a competitive situation rather than
a single decision maker.
As explained in the Introduction, a generic computational
theory for SDPs under uncertainty, multiple players and a
finite but unknown number of decision steps is, to the best
of our knowledge, still missing. Developing such a theory
is a challenging research program. The theory would have
to span the border between control and game theory and
likely require the introduction of new equilibrium notions.
One promising approach towards developing a general the-
ory of optimal decision making is to extend the formalization
of SDPs presented in Botta et al. (2017b) using the notions
of “quantifier” and “selection function” (together with their
respective products) introduced in Escardo and Oliva (2010);
Hedges (2017) for infinite horizon open games.
From a more applicational point of view, there are two ob-
vious ways in which the work presented in this paper could
be extended to provide more useful insights into the problem
of making optimal decisions on emission paths under uncer-
tainty.
One would be to compute optimal emission policies for
a realistic emission problem. Besides extending the notions
of state and control spaces and, e.g., allowing the decision
maker to pick up a few intermediate emission levels be-
tween Low and High , this would require assessing the costs
and benefits of implementing a given emission level using
a realistic integrated assessment model. Such an enterprise
would require an interdisciplinary effort on the border be-
tween climate science and computing science. Technically, it
would require extending the framework for the specification
of SDPs SequentialDecisionProblems7 with a small domain-
specific language for emission problems.
Another way of extending the work presented in this pa-
per would be to keep the focus on stylized emission prob-
lems like the one of Sect. 4 but improve the statistical study
of the logical consequences of taking decisions according to
optimal policy sequences. This could yield tools that sup-
port accountable decision making in real-time situations, for
instance, during negotiations. Technically, this would imply,
among other things, extending SequentialDecisionProblems
with algorithms for computing all optimal policies for a given
decision problem or perhaps just a certain number of optimal
policies.
As we have seen at the end of Sect. 5, computing optimal
policies and parsing large collections of possible trajectories
or “decision networks” can be computationally challenging
even for idealized problems.
Thus, extending SequentialDecisionProblems for comput-
ing more optimal policy sequences and more comprehen-
sive statistical analyses of decision networks would benefit
from exploiting the concurrency inherent in many of the al-
gorithms presented in Botta et al. (2017b). This is also an in-
terdisciplinary enterprise involving formal methods (concur-
rent implementations should preserve the machine-checkable
optimality proofs that come with the sequential implementa-
tion), high-performance computing and climate science.
7 https://gitlab.pik-potsdam.de/botta/IdrisLibs
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Appendix A: a summary of Botta et al. (2017a)
The theory presented in Botta et al. (2017a) allows for the
specification of SDPs with uncertain outcomes and, for a spe-
cific problem, the computation of provably optimal policy
sequences and the possible consequences of taking decisions
according to an arbitrary policy sequence.
As explained in the Introduction, the theory is dependently
typed and the formalization language is Idris; see Brady
(2013). Here, we summarize the main requirements and the
main results of the theory in a simplified form. For a more de-
tailed discussion of the notion of decision process, decision
problem, monadic decision problem, uncertainty, reachabil-
ity, viability, policy, policy sequence, possible trajectories
and avoidability, we refer the reader to Botta et al. (2017a).
In a nutshell, a monadic SDP can be specified in terms of the
four functions already introduced in Sect. 2:
State : (t : N) → Type
Ctrl : (t : N) → (x : State t) → Type
next : (t : N) → (x : State t) → (y : Ctrl t x ) →
M (State (t + 1))
reward : (t : N) → (x : State t) → (y : Ctrl t x ) →
(x ′ : State (S t)) → Val
M here is a monad and represents the problem’s uncer-
tainties. For deterministic problems (no uncertainties), M is
equal to Id and next associates with a state–control pair a
unique next state. For nondeterministic problems M = List
and for stochastic problems M = Prob. Since M is a monad
and therefore a functor, it is equipped with a function
fmap : (a → b) → M a → M b
that maps functions of type a → b for arbitrary a,b : Type
to functions of type M a → M b and preserves identity and
function composition. The type of the values returned by the
reward function, Val , is required to be equipped with a zero
value zero : Val , with an addition (⊕) : Val → Val →
Val and with a total preorder (v). Moreover, ⊕ is required
to be monotonic with respect to (v):
monotonePlusLTE : a v b → c v d → (a ⊕ c)v (b⊕ d)
As mentioned in Sect. 2, a decision maker has also to specify
a monotonous measure for weighting uncertain outcomes
meas : M Val → Val
measMon : {A : Type } →
(f : A → Val) → (g : A → Val) →
((a : A) → (f a)v (g a)) →
(ma : Prob A) →
meas (fmap f ma)vmeas (fmap g ma)
The functions monotonePlusLTE and measMon are exam-
ples of specifications: their types formulate properties that⊕,
(v) and meas have to fulfill for the Botta et al. (2017a) the-
ory to be applicable. In this Appendix, we will see further
examples of propositional types that encode notions, e.g., of
optimality or, as in the case of Bellman , theorems of the
Botta et al. (2017a) theory. With the notions of states and
controls in place, one can formalize the notions of policy and
policy sequence:
Policy : (t : N) → Type
Policy t = (x : State t) → Ctrl t x
data PolicySeq : (t : N) → (n : N) → Type where
Nil : PolicySeq t Z
(::) : Policy t → PolicySeq (S t) m →
PolicySeq t (S m)
As discussed in Sect. 2, policies are functions that associate
controls with states. They are dependently typed because the
domain of Policy t depends on the decision step index t .
Moreover, its co-domain, Ctrl t x , depends on t and on x .
Policy sequences are just sequences of policies. Since
policies are dependently typed functions, we cannot simply
collect them in a list or in a vector. The data declaration
PolicySeq completely defines the set of all possible policy
sequences. In particular, a sequence can only be empty (Nil ,
for n = 0) or consist of a head (a policy for taking a decision
step at an arbitrary decision step t) consed (in functional lan-
guages, the data constructor (::) is called Cons , and p :: ps
is spelled p “consed” with ps) together with another policy
sequence.
For a consistent theory of sequential decision making un-
der uncertainty, the notions of policy and policy sequence
actually have to be made more precise. This requires intro-
ducing the notions of reachability and viability. In this sum-
mary, we omit these important but rather technical aspects,
see Botta et al. (2017a). As explained in Sect. 2, the notion
of optimality for policy sequences is defined in terms of the
measured sum of possible rewards. This is given by a value
function
val : (x : State t) → PolicySeq t n → Val
val {t } {n = Z } x ps = zero
val {t } {n = S m } x (p :: ps) = meas (fmap f mx ′) where
y : Ctrl t x
y = p x
f : State (S t) → Val
f x ′ = reward t x y x ′⊕ val x ′ ps
mx ′ : M (State (S t))
mx ′ = next t x y
Notice that when the policy sequence is not empty, the mea-
sure meas has to be applied to the result obtained by adding
reward t x y x ′ (the reward obtained by selecting the con-
trol y in x and for the next state x ′) to val x ′ ps (the value
of making m decisions according to the policy sequence ps)
for every x ′ in next t x y . It is this recursive call of val for
every x ′ in next t x y that makes the problem of evaluating
policy sequences computationally intractable. For the case in
which State t is finite, one can recover linear complexity in
n via tabulation.
Earth Syst. Dynam., 9, 525–542, 2018 www.earth-syst-dynam.net/9/525/2018/
N. Botta et al.: The impact of uncertainty on optimal emission policies 541
The value of policy sequences is the key for formalizing
the notion of optimality for policy sequences: a policy se-
quence for n decision steps is optimal if and only if no other
sequence (also for n decisions) attains a higher sum of pos-
sible rewards for any state:
OptPolicySeq : PolicySeq t n → Type
OptPolicySeq {t } {n } ps = (ps ′ : PolicySeq t n) →
(x : State t) →
val x ps ′ v val x ps
The main result of the theory presented in Botta et al. (2017a)
is a verified, generic implementation of backwards induction:
bi : (t : N) → (n : N) → PolicySeq t n
bi t Z = Nil
bi t (S n) = optExt ps :: ps where
ps : PolicySeq (S t) n
ps = bi (S t) n
biLemma : (t : N) → (n : N) → OptPolicySeq (bi t n)
The implementation of biLemma relies on the notion of op-
timal extension of a policy sequence
OptExt : PolicySeq (S t) m → Policy t → Type
OptExt {t } {m } ps p = (x : State t) →
(p′ : Policy t) →
val x (p′ :: ps)v val x (p :: ps)
and on a formal proof (that is, a total implementation) of
Bellman’s principle of optimality (Bellman, 1957):
Bellman : (ps : PolicySeq (S t) m) → OptPolicySeq ps →
(p : Policy t (S m)) → OptExt ps p →
OptPolicySeq (p :: ps)
As usual when encoding propositions through types we read
Bellman as the first-order logic proposition: for every pol-
icy sequence ps and every policy p, if ps is optimal and p is
an optimal extension of ps , then p :: ps is optimal. The im-
plementation of bi relies on optExt : this is a function that
takes a policy sequence and computes one of its optimal ex-
tensions:
optExt : PolicySeq (S t) n → Policy t (S n)
optExtLemma : (ps : PolicySeq (S t) n) →
OptExt ps (optExt ps)
Thus, computing the optimal extension of a policy sequence
of type PolicySeq (S t) n implies solving an optimization
problem for every state in State t . If the set of control
Ctrl t x is finite for a given x : State t , this problem can
be solved by linear search. A further result of the theory pre-
sented in Botta et al. (2017a) is a generic algorithm for com-
puting all possible trajectories that can be obtained by apply-
ing a policy sequence (optimal or not) starting from a given
state or, if the decision maker takes decisions with imperfect
information, from an M structure of states. In both cases, the
result is an M structure of state–control sequences:
data StateCtrlSeq : (t : N) → (n : N) → Type where
Nil : (x : State t) → StateCtrlSeq t Z
(::) : Σ (State t) (Ctrl t) → StateCtrlSeq (S t) n →
StateCtrlSeq t (S n)
possibleStateCtrlSeqs : (x : State t) →
(ps : PolicySeq t n) →
M (StateCtrlSeq t n)
morePossibleStateCtrlSeqs : (mx : M (State t)) →
(ps : PolicySeq t n) →
M (StateCtrlSeq t n)
For the implementations of biLemma , Bellman ,
possibleStateCtrlSeqs and morePossibleStateCtrlSeqs
we refer the reader to Botta et al. (2017a). In Sect. 5
we make extensive usage of, among other things, bi and
possibleStateCtrlSeqs for computing optimal emission
policies and possible state–control sequences.
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